Spam costs US corporations upwards of $8.9 billion a year, and comprises as much as 40% of all email received [1]. Solutions exist to reduce the amount of spam seen by end users, but cannot withstand sophisticated attacks. Worse yet, many will occasionally misclassify and silently drop legitimate email. Spammers take advantage of the near-zero cost of sending email to flood the network, knowing that success even a tiny fraction of the time means a profit. End users, however, have proven unwilling to pay money to send email to friends and family.
Introduction
Unsolicited email has become a real problem. Companies around the globe are losing billions of dollars each year in the form of lost productivity. And the spammers are profiting; 8% of Internet users bought something from spam in 2003 [1] .
Unfortunately, the numbers in this game favor the spammers. A marketer can send billions of emails at negligible cost; to realize a profit, only a handful need result in a sale. Every email which makes it through our arsenal of spam filters carries with it a very real cost to the recipient, who must spend time to identify and discard the message. Spammers have strong incentives to evade or subvert any mechanism we deploy, while the recipients bear the cost of dealing with any email that leaks through.
Antispam solutions generally attempt either to reduce the leakage by improving the quality of filtration or to reduce the profit potential by imposing a cost for sending spam. Approaches which attempt the former are in the unenviable position of not being able to safely err on either side in their classification, as they risk either being ineffectual or dropping desired email. In this paper, we will primarily take the latter approach, of introducing penalties for sending spam, and we will show that in our system:
• Legitimate email is never misclassified or dropped.
• Well-behaved users do not pay to send email.
• Legitimate mass mailing is supported.
Clearly it is also necessary to provide attack resistance, assuming sophisticated spammers who will optimize their strategies for any solution we deploy. This is accomplished by requiring bulk email senders to accurately classify each email message they send as an advertisement and its area of interest or else be charged a small negative incentive per message delivered to a recipient, a micro-penalty. This micro-penalty multiplied by the scale required for spam makes it uneconomic to lie. Reliable classification makes it feasible for email recipients to filter out advertising emails that are outside their scope of interest. We show that it is feasible to log all email so that violations can be acted on quickly and securely while resisting attacks, supporting opt-in mailing lists as well as direct person-to-person email, and requiring only modest changes to existing email servers while being economic to deploy to Internet scale.
Tagging Bulk Mail
We require senders to annotate all bulk email with a new header field, X-BULK-MAIL. At this time we define two types of bulk mail: advertising and mailing lists (described further in Section 5). Advertising emails are tagged with an ADV leader followed by a commaseparated list of interest groups. Interest groups are defined hierarchically, with terms separated by dots, and can be defined organically as the system evolves. For instance, an advertisement for suntan lotion might include the header X-BULK-MAIL: ADV: REC.SPORTS.SWIMMING,
REC.SPORTS.SAILING
A user can easily establish filters to discard mail for categories he isn't interested in. Ideally this would be provided as a service by his ISP.
When email received is considered to have been misclassified, whether because it is lacking the appropriate header or because it has been designated with an inappropriate interest group, the user will forward the email to his ISP using his email client's bounce or redirect command. This preserves the full headers of the email, allowing the penalty phase of the system to take effect.
In our system, we define personal email to be any email which does not carry an X-BULK-MAIL tag. It is treated in the same way as bulk mail, and is presumed to be of interest to all recipients. Email which is not of interest, such as advertising, can be objected to on the basis of misclassification.
Penalizing Misbehavior
Each email server is extended to log relevant header information from the mail it forwards over a window of two weeks. Specifically, we store the (cryptographically secure) hash of the DATE, TO, FROM, and RECEIVED fields.
When an ISP receives a spam complaint, it can perform a lookup to validate that the complaint references a genuine email. It then forwards the complaint on to the previous relay in the path. It also requires the upstream relay pay it the required micro-penalty. That relay will recover the cost when it passes the complaint on.
The result of this process is as if the micro-penalty were levied against the ISP of the sender by the ISP of the recipient. The sender's ISP can choose how to deal with the complaint, but should at a minimum include forwarding the complaint to the user and imposing some form of sanction.
For this system of penalties to work, we must also establish a few procedural elements. First, as stated before, we have a history of forwarded email to work from to prevent fraudulent use of the penalty system. We also refuse to forward email that is more than a week old. An enforceable penalty process must be set up between SMTP peers, and relays must refuse unknown connections. In section 7 we discuss how an ISP might redirect unknown relays to more permissive ingress points. Finally, ISPs must specify some form of ingress rate limit, to bound their potential outstanding liability. The monthly service fee paid by end users could be considered a bond against which the user borrows to send email.
The impact of these constraints on typical clients is negligible. Consider an ISP which charges $30/mo for Internet access, and a micro-penalty fee of $0.10. The ISP limits customers to sending 100 emails per week, and terminates accounts on receipt of 10 spam complaints over a 3-month period. In this scenario, the ISP has a maximum outstanding liability of $20.90 per client, which is safely less than the monthly service fee. The ISP could also choose to allow clients to reset their spam counter in exchange for a $1 fee. Clients would need to send more than 100 emails in a one week or send 10 offensive emails before noticing the constraints of the system. Upgraded accounts with an explicit surety could be provided to address these issues for the handful of customers who require greater flexibility.
To the spammer, however, even a $0.10 fee is profound. As a reference point consider DoubleClick, which provides legitimate marketers with the tools needed to maintain high-quality lists of interested users. For these lists in Q1 of 2004 [12] , DoubleClick customers saw a revenue of $0.23 per email. Few enterprises could afford to spend 40% of their revenue on marketing, and few spammers will have returns anywhere close to that seen by the carefully culled lists maintained by professional marketing companies.
Attack Resistance
For clarity of presentation, we have so far ignored the possibility of malicious entities. It is critical, however, to demonstrate that attackers cannot evade the system to send email without being held accountable, and that they cannot subvert the system to charge innocent users.
Assigning Responsibility
Suppose Alice receives spam, for which she forwards a complaint to her ISP. There are only three possible attackers: the sender, some host on the path, and the receiver (her ISP). There is no way to send email in our record route environment without being on-path (unless there is an on-path accomplice, which is itself an attacker).
Assuming that there are no misbehaving hosts on the path between Alice and the sender, it is clear the spammer will be charged. Using a fake return address will not help, since the complaint will use the unforgeable portion of the RECEIVED header path to reach his ISP, which has a clear economic incentive to correctly identify the true sender as well as the means to do so, since it controls where and how email enters its network. The complaint cannot be forwarded by the sender to another host because it will not be present in the mail history for that node.
Suppose there is some host on the path between Alice and the sender which is misbehaving. It cannot refuse to validate the spam complaint without jeopardizing its relationship with its downstream peer. The complaint will, in turn, only be accepted by the upstream ISP towards the true sender. Spam forged by this host would result in the host receiving complaints which could not be forwarded to any "upstream" peers.
This misbehaving host could hijack legitimate mail traffic by replacing the body of the email. This would be detected by the endpoints of the communication channel, and eventually the culprit uncloaked. This more pernicious attack also requires the malignant host be on the path between Alice and some other user she wants to talk with, which is already unlikely given the short length of typical SMTP relay paths and the relative trustworthiness of genuinely on-path hosts.
Finally, Alice's ISP could itself send her spam, or refuse to take action against spammers within the local network. The free market suggests that such ISPs will not last very long, as users who find this behavior distasteful will simply take their business elsewhere.
Protecting Innocent Users
We also prevent malicious nodes from abusing the spam reporting system itself. In this case, the attacker could be an endpoint, some ISP on the path between two nodes, or an off-path entity.
A client can only complain about an email she actually receives because ISPs validate all complaints against their histories. This also automatically excludes reverse path forgery and makes it easy to prevent recipients from filing more than one complaint per spam.
A malicious on-path node is prevented from forging complaints for the same reasons as for an endpoint. It would be possible for the node to generate spam complaints about email which it was only supposed to forward. However, because the sender is informed when complaints are lodged, this type of misbehavior can be easily detected.
A true off-path attacker would need to somehow derive the headers of emails traversing the network in order to file spam complaints. Guessing these would not be feasible, but the attacker might try to snoop email sessions or have an on-path accomplice forward the relevant data. However, it still would not be possible for the attacker to introduce a spam complaint into the network at any of the well-behaved relays, as these nodes would know the attacker was not a suitable next hop for the original email.
Other Issues
It is conceivable that users might accidentally file spam complaints against desirable email. Anecdotal evidence from the SPAM-L mailing list [2] indicates that some of the spam reports generated in AOL's Feedback Loop [6] are a result of just this effect. In general, lower rates of spam are likely to lead to less accidental complaints. Simple interface improvements, such as requesting confirmation or password entry may also help to further reduce this effect. Finally, our future work on conversational indemnity should also help reduce the impact of accidental reports.
The issue of zombie hosts is also of concern, because it violates the assumption that email sent by a host is intentional by the user. However, the amount of damage a single host can do is severely constrained due to the requisite ingress rate limiting. Furthermore, the threat of losing email privileges gives users a real incentive to notice and promptly clean up infections. Finally, consumer ISPs could provide as a service to customers some level of early notification and/or prevention through signature analysis or other monitoring technique. In the end, we must hold a user accountable for the behavior of his computer.
Opt-in Bulk Mail
Mailing lists are special cases of bulk mailers, because although they may need to send a number of messages each day to thousands of subscribers, they have explicitly been allowed to do so by the process of subscription. In light of this, it does not seem practical for the mailing list to assume liability for every subscriber. Nor does it seem fair to charge the original sender for every ultimate recipient, when the sender cannot necessarily determine in advance who those individuals are. However, it is also clear that mailing lists are a widely used, and therefore desirable, feature of the current email system.
To solve this we introduce recipient-side whitelisting. When an opt-in bulk sender (such as a mailing list) sends email, it flags it with a special X-BULK-MAIL header, which consists of a LIST leader followed by an identifier for the list. The identifier could either be derived from the list name or could be a random nonce. For instance, X-BULK-MAIL: LIST: FREEFOOD.348290 SMTP relays along the path do not include entries in their histories for such email. The final relay, however, will drop any email marked as list mail which is not explicitly whitelisted by that recipient. Whitelisting is done based on the list identifier and, optionally, the reverse path to the mailing list's remailer.
This mechanism works in exactly the way we expect mailing lists to operate. The act of subscription adds the user's email address to the list of addresses on the list and also adds the list to the local whitelist. Unsubscription is simply removing the mailing list from the local whitelist. Additionally, we gain the ability to force withdrawal from a list by removing the local whitelist entry.
From the viewpoint of the list operator, opt-in lists in our system carry the benefit of guaranteed protection from liability, because users cede their ability to complain by virtue of subscribing to the list. List operators could abuse this power by filling the list with spam, but the ability to force unsubscription means that users only pay temporarily for their mistakes.
Implementation
As a reference implementation we have produced an SMTP proxy intended to be placed in front of a site's existing infrastructure. From this vantage point it is straightforward to inspect all messages entering the network from an SMTP peer and to log the requisite hash. Similarly, messages from internal users destined for the outside world can be logged and rate controlled. This is also a suitable location to deal with spam complaints. When a user receives an undesirable message, he simply redirects the message (this preserves the original headers) to SPAMSINK@LOCALDOMAIN, and the proxy intercepts this message. It strips off the downstream headers, validates the message against its logs, and then forwards the complaint upstream. In particular, note that it is not necessary to log at every SMTP host; within a single domain of trust, only one log point is necessary.
To avoid duplication of configuration information, our proxy is tightly coupled to a slave SMTP server. Commands are passed directly through to the downstream server, except where needed to preserve the semantics of the SMTP protocol. The proxy can then determine whether a command was successful by inspecting the server's response, and takes that into account when updating its state. The upshot of this is that the proxy server can depend upon the real server to enforce any policies the site may have in place (for instance, the set of addressable destinations) without needing any separate logic or configuration. The only notable exception to this is user authentication, which the proxy needs to know about in order to perform rate limiting. But it only makes sense that the proxy should provide this, as existing servers lack the functionality.
The exact performance characteristics of the proxy will, naturally, depend upon the load characteristics of the site it serves. We assume an ISP such as Princeton University [7] (which publishes its SMTP traffic statistics online). A generous interpretation of the statistics available shows that in the month of February, 2005, Princeton saw at most a few thousand SMTP messages per minute. This figure is roughly in line with CAIDA measurements of 1.6 million SMTP sessions per day [13] .
If we assume a constant rate of 3000 messages per minute, or 60 million messages over the two-week window, our solution requires about 3 gigabytes of storage for logging. Our experiments show that storing the log entry for each email costs approximately 3.1msec on a singleproc P4 3.2GHz with 10k RPM SATA drive; for the suggested load this means the SMTP relay (or a dedicated logging machine) will spend 15% of its time dealing with hashes. Checking a spam complaint against the database of log entries costs just 0.77 msec. Computing the hash for an email costs just 39 usec.
Full performance results, including analysis of performance under load bursts, are pending. However, the results shown here do not include any attempts to optimize the logging mechanism; each write results in synchronous disk I/O. Note that it should be possible to maintain the entire 3GB of history in memory for reasonable cost, with periodic writes to disk just to prevent data loss in the event of a crash. Writing the whole hash table to disk takes less than 5 minutes, and could of course be done in stages.
Incremental Deployment
Although we present this work in a context which assumes global deployment, it is also incrementally deployable, by which we mean that there is a benefit realized by ISPs who deploy this system, even if all of their neighbors do not. Specifically, an ISP who deploys our proposal can guarantee that it will never drop email for its customers, while also moderating the risk that this will cause an increase in spam load.
Assume some ISP chooses to deploy our system. It will then have two categories of neighbors: those with whom it can negotiate contracts, and those with whom it cannot. When an ISP can set up the contractual arrangement we specified earlier, it need not care if the peer ISP has also deployed the system or not, because that ISP has already agreed to be accountable for all the email it sends.
When an ISP cannot set up a contractual relationship with another ISP, it must instead treat that neighbor as a potential spammer. Specifically, it should keep track of the amount of spam received from that specific ISP so that exceeding some threshold (say 100 objectionable emails in a month) will cause the peer to be cut off. Future email from that peer can then be bounced, with an indication that the ISP has been identified as a source of spam and a few remedies suggested (such as switching to a compliant ISP or asking your ISP to become compliant). Our deploying ISP does assume financial responsibility for any email accepted from this peer ISP, particularly if it is not destined for one of its direct customers. It is important to realize that there is no requirement that one must accept email from anyone on the Internet; as such these peering relationships can be pre-screened to eliminate known spammers.
Additionally, during this transitional phase, ISPs can continue to use traditional antispam techniques such as content-based filtration or blacklisting. These techniques are not particularly useful in a world where everyone has deployed our system, but they can be applied against these "unaccountable" peer ISPs. However, it should be understood that to avoid silently dropping email, an indicative error response must be sent back if the traditional methods cause the email to be classified as spam.
In this paper we treat the SMTP reverse path is if there could be any number of ISPs on the path between sender and recipient. In practice, of course, the sender ISP will contact the recipient's ISP directly (by performing a lookup of an MX record for the destination domain). But it is impractical to assume that every pair of ISPs will be able to negotiate (and enforce) the contractual relationship we require. Rather, deployment of our system will result in baby ISPs signing contracts with larger for the ability to participate in the global exchange of email. Conveniently, there is enough flexibility in the system of MX records to allow automatic traversal of the tree (or several trees). When an unknown peer attempts to send email, the recipient's server will simply terminate the session, at which point the sender will happily try the next entry in the list. In this manner, email ingress gradually moves from less permissive to more permissive, eventually settling on the appropriate entry point.
Related Work
A number of different solutions to the spam problem have been suggested; some have even seen widespread deployment. Unfortunately, the existing literature has not accurately gauged the sophistication of the attackers, leading to solutions which are not effective enough to stem the ongoing flood of spam.
Content-based filtering solutions, particularly those based on machine learning, have been the most effective anti-spam treatment to date. But they will never be able to guarantee that they will not decide to randomly drop legitimate email. This is an anathema in a world where we are trying to push to five-nine reliability and beyond. Worse yet, because these solutions will always leak some amount of traffic, they fail to address the core issue that spamming will continue to be profitable so long as a trickle of bandwidth exists. In general, not only is content-based filtering dangerous because it leads to false positives, it continually becomes less effective as spammers learn how to construct emails to get around the filtering algorithms.
More than a decade ago, Dwork and Naor introduced the idea of using computational stamps to price email [8] . This idea has been respun in a variety of different clothes, including a recent paper by Balakrishnan and Karger [9] . Unfortunately, such solutions are unlikely to ever succeed, because users are simply not willing to pay for a service they view as being free. And if the fee is purely computational (as suggested by the original work), then it is too easy to farm the computation off to unknowing users through the use of a botnet, cooperative spyware, or even a background javascript task on a popular webpage. Advances in reverse Turing tests such as CAPTCHAs [5] , though appealing in concept as a method of postage stamping will suffer from the same popularity problems. Additionally, spammers have apparently found ways to offload this processing by using the puzzle images as conditions for admission to porn sites [4] .
There is also a continual effort from within the Internet community to maintain various blacklists, which are then used to drop spam. In theory these should never produce false positives, as only mail validated as spam is added to the list. But they cannot prevent letting some spam through, and thus are not a true deterrent. Additionally, lists driven by Internet telescopy will only work so long as spammers are not aware of the set of trigger addresses. Lists driven by voluntary reporting are even scarier; eventually spammers will find a way to pollute these lists with false reports, at which point claims of never dropping desirable mail go out the window. Explicit whitelist solutions such as ChoiceMail [3] provide an interesting twist. They do provide the additional benefit of requiring email to have a legitimate return address. However, the whitelist request mechanism can itself be leveraged to spam. Reverse Turing tests, though better suited to this application than email stamping, still suffer the same issues of being sharable.
The sheer scale of the spam problem on the Internet today, coupled with the technological savvy exhibited by spammers, leaves us with little choice but to introduce accountability into the network, and then establishing a system of economic disincentives for abusers. Our solution does this by introducing logs within the network. The Bonded Sender [10] and SHRED [11] systems suggest achieving this goal through the use of what are effectively prepurchased cryptographic stamps belonging to some trusted third party. The Bonded Sender solution, though, because it only tries to target (legitimate) bulk mailers, is only able to solve part of the problem. The SHRED proposal, recent research by Krishnamurthy and Blackmond, does seem more promising. It is our belief that by providing validation from within the network, we are able to achieve better attack resistance. In particular, we demonstrate in this paper that the economic disincen-tives of our system will always work against spammers; solutions requiring trusted parties are likely to find it difficult to provide the same level of assurance. Additionally, by providing spammers with the ability to achieve legitimacy by classifying their email, we simultaneously reduce the load on the penalty system and give users better automated visibility into the email they receive.
Future Work
One way in which this system could readily be extended would be to provide conversational indemnity. That is, include the ability to negate a spam complaint by presenting evidence (in the form of a prior email) that the other party initiated communication. This could be validated by the ISPs at each end of the communication chain using the same hash history table which we use to validate spam complaints.
This sort of conversation-based indemnity could also be used to reduce the effect of accidental complaints. Additionally, this mechanism could be used to make it safe to set up an email autoresponder (along the lines of the unix vacation program) without turning your computer into an attack reflector. It might also be possible for ISPs to use this mechanism to relax ingress limits on users, since a response to an email would constitute an acknowledgment that the original email was not spam.
The challenge here is in ensuring that an attacker cannot leverage the indemnity mechanism to evade penalty (for instance, by playing with the 2-week history window or reusing the same refutation multiple times). Additionally, the ISP should be able to automatically refute a complaint on behalf of the user, but we do not want the ISP to maintain copies of all of a user's email.
Conclusion
We describe a system in which bulk email senders are required to accurately classify each email message they send or be charged a small negative incentive for each recipient. A history of forwarded email receipts maintained by relays along the path provides automated verification for spam complaints by recipients, which are forwarded towards senders to provide a robust, attackresistant penalty mechanism.
We show that this system allows person-to-person and opt-in bulk email for free, without ever misclassifying or dropping email, needs only modest changes to the existing SMTP infrastructure, and remains scalable to Internet scale. Novel contributions include the use of service fees as sureties for typical consumers, the separation of and improved protection for inherently opt-in mailing list bulk mail versus opt-out lists, and the enforceability of voluntary classification by advertisers.
